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Abstract
We investigate the problem of secure communications in a Gaussian multi-way relay channel
applying the compute-and-forward scheme using nested lattice codes. All nodes employ half-duplex
operation and can exchange confidential messages only via an untrusted relay. The relay is assumed
to be honest but curious, i.e., an eavesdropper that conforms to the system rules and applies the
intended relaying scheme.
We start with the general case of the single-input multiple-output (SIMO) L-user multi-way
relay channel and provide an achievable secrecy rate region under a weak secrecy criterion. We
show that the securely achievable sum rate is equivalent to the difference between the computation
rate and the multiple access channel (MAC) capacity. Particularly, we show that all nodes must
encode their messages such that the common computation rate tuple falls outside the MAC capacity
region of the relay. We provide results for the single-input single-output (SISO) and the multiple-
input single-input (MISO) L-user multi-way relay channel as well as the two-way relay channel. We
discuss these results and show the dependency between channel realization and achievable secrecy
rate. We further compare our result to available results in the literature for different schemes and
show that the proposed scheme operates close to the compute-and-forward rate without secrecy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding has been a promising topic in communications since introduced by
Ahlswede et al. in [1]. It was shown that network coding can improve the throughput of
a network and achieves the multicast capacity. For static wired networks network coding is
very well investigated and some frameworks are developed [2], [3], [4], [5]. On the other
hand, there is a lot of ongoing work in the field of network coding for wireless networks. The
properties of the wireless channel give the possibility for network coding on different layers.
Practical network coding on the forwarding layer has been proposed in [6]. The superposition
property of the wireless channel also allows network coding on the physical layer, where the
actual network coding is already done by the channel. Physical layer network coding has
been investigated in [7] and gained a lot of attention. [8] gives a survey on physical layer
network coding techniques. In [9], this approach has been further developed to the compute-
and-forward scheme for which the noise is immediately removed at any relay node in the
network. This is achieved by decoding linear combinations of incoming symbols at a relay
instead of decoding them individually. Compute-and-forward is based on structured codes
like lattice codes that have been shown to achieve the additive white Gaussian noise channel
capacity with lattice decoding in place of maximum-likelihood decoding in [10].
Beside reliable communication, secrecy considerations have also become more important.
Cryptography is based on the currently available computation performance and the time
needed to decrypt a message without having the secret key. This kind of security will get
weaker with increasing computational power in the years to come. Secrecy on the physical
layer offers the possibility that an eavesdropper does not get any information about the
exchanged messages. Wyner [11] and Csiszár and Körner [12] proved that confidential data
transmission over wiretap channels can be attained by channel coding without secret keys in
terms of weak and strong secrecy, respectively. The achievable secrecy rate in the presence
of an untrusted relay is studied in several papers with slightly different scenarios. In [13]
Huang et al. investigate different secure transmission schemes in a relay network with a direct
connection between source and destination. The question if an untrusted relay is helpful if
a direct connection between source and destination exists has been investigated in [14]. In
[15] a Gaussian two-hop network is considered where source and destination do not have a
direct connection. The destination node can help the source node by jamming the relay node
with a random signal. This model is extended in [16] to a multi-hop line network.
The two-way wiretap channel, in which two nodes can only exchange messages via an
untrusted relay, was first considered in [17], [18]. It was shown that cooperative jamming, i.e.,
jamming with controlled interference between codewords, could reduce the eavesdropper’s
signal-to-noise ratio and hence improve the level of weak secrecy. In [19] it was shown that
this result also holds for strong secrecy.
Most secrecy schemes are based on random codes but there is also work done in the field of
secrecy through structured codes, namely lattice codes. Achievable rates for the lattice coded
Gaussian wiretap channel have been developed in [20]. Theorem 1 in [20] proposes a lattice
code construction that achieves the weak secrecy capacity. Lattice codes for the Gaussian
wiretap channel have been intensively studied by Oggier et al. in [21] and references therein.
They introduced the secrecy gain as a design criterion for good lattice codes for wiretap
channels in [22]. It was shown by Ling et al. that lattice codes can achieve strong secrecy
over the mod-Λ Gaussian channel [23]. In [24] Ling et al. introduced the flatness factor [25]
as the main tool to prove that nested lattice codes can achieve semantic security and strong
secrecy over the Gaussian wiretap channel. Compute-and-forward network coding together
with strong physical-layer security based on universal hash functions has been investigated in
[15]. All these works focus either on a wiretap channel or on a two-hop relay network where
a source node transmits via an untrusted relay to a destination. The destination may help
by jamming but does not transmit a secure message itself. In [26] Kashyap et al. consider a
two-way relay network with an untrusted relay where two nodes transmit one message each
simultaneously via an untrusted relay. They provide an achievable power-rate region with
perfect secrecy as well as strong secrecy by applying compute-and-forward.
In this work we consider a L-user relay channel where all users want to securely transmit a
message to all other users. There does not exist direct connections between the users and they
have to transmit via an untrusted relay which applies compute-and-forward. We investigate
the single-input multiple-output (SIMO) multi-way relay channel and provide an achievable
weak secrecy rate region. We prove this result and derive results for the single-input single-
output (SISO) and multiple-input single-output (MISO) multi-way relay channel as well as
the SISO two-way relay channel, which can be seen as special cases of the SIMO multi-way
relay channel. Finally, we provide simulation results and compare our scheme against existing
schemes.
Our scheme has several advantages over existing schemes. The previous work of [27] and
[26] does not consider fading channels and their results can not be easily extended. Our
scheme however takes fading into account and uses only well-known techniques like random
binning for wiretap channels and compute-and-forward for two-way relaying. Further, we
provide an descriptive and convincing interpretation of our result, i.e., the secrecy rate is
the compute-and-forward rate region minus the multiple access channel (MAC) rate region.
We also achieve a slightly higher secrecy rate when we simplify our model to the model
used for example in [27]. A drawback of our scheme is the weak secrecy criterion instead of
strong or even perfect secrecy. However, this disadvantage might be overcome by extending
our scheme with the same techniques as in [15], namely hashing functions, to provide strong
secrecy. This will be part of future work and is not addressed in this paper.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II the system model and the coding scheme
are given. Section III provides an achievable secrecy rate region for the L-user SIMO multi-
way relay channel. Section IV derives from the previous result the achievable secrecy rate
region for the SISO and the MISO multi-way relay channel. Section V investigates the special
case of the SISO two-way relay channel. Section VI discusses the results and illustrates them
with simulations. Section VII concludes the work.
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Figure 1: System model: Multi-Way Relay-Channel
A. Notation
Let log+(x) , max{0, log(x)}. We denote by x′ the transpose of vector x and by ei the unit
vector with a one at position i and zeros elsewhere. Further we denote by H(X) the entropy
of a discrete random variable X and by h(Y ) the differential entropy of a continuous random
variable Y . The mutual information between two random variables X and Y is denoted by
I(X;Y ). Let P(X) be the power set of set X . By δ(n) we denote a function that tends to
zero if n goes to infinity.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We investigate the multi-way relay-channel with half-duplex nodes as depicted in Figure 1.
All nodes have messages for each other but have no direct connection. They transmit messages
w1, . . . , wL with the help of a relay in L phases. We denote by x` ∈ Rn and xr ∈ Rn the
transmit signals of the user nodes 1, . . . , L and the relay, respectively. Analogously, we define
y` ∈ Rn and yr ∈ Rn as the received signals at the user nodes and the relay. Each node has
a transmit power constraint ‖xi‖2 ≤ nP, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L, r}. The links are additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels with quasi static block flat fading with fading coefficients
hi and noise zi with i ∈ {1, . . . , L, r}. We assume that the channels are reciprocal and
constant over all L phases. This results in the following channel model
yr =
L∑
`=1
h`x` + zr, (1a)
y` = h`xr + z`. (1b)
We consider four scenarios:
1) multiple antennas at the relay, which is covered in Section III,
2) multiple antennas at the user nodes, which is covered in Section IV,
3) single antennas at all nodes, which is covered in Section IV, and
4) the two-way relay channel with single antennas at all nodes as a special but important
case, which is covered in Section V.
In practice it often happens that such a transmission between nodes has to use a relay that
cannot be trusted. Therefore the messages have to be encoded at the source nodes such that
the relay cannot decode the messages separately. The reliability requirement at the user nodes
1, . . . , L can be written as
lim
n→∞
Pr(wˆ` 6= w`) = 0, ∀` = 1, . . . , L (2)
and the weak secrecy requirement as
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W;Yr) = 0, (3)
for all W ∈ P({W1, . . . ,WL}) where n is the block length or number of channel uses. For
the analysis of the secrecy condition we will also use the following alternative representation
of (3)
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W) ≤ lim
n→∞
H(W | Y ). (4)
We get the achievable secrecy rates Rs1 , . . . , RsL by choosing H(W`) = 2
nRs` such that
lim
n→∞
1
n
log2H(W`) = Rs` . (5)
Because the relay is the indented receiver of the messages and the eavesdropper at the
same time, some additional effort is needed to ensure secret message transmission. We can
already see, that we can achieve this condition only if we apply a relaying scheme where the
relay does not need to decode the single messages. Further we need to achieve a transmission
rate larger than the MAC capacity otherwise the relay would be able to decode the single
messages. This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. A relaying strategy which allows
to fulfill these requirements is compute-and-forward, which was introduced by Nazer and
Gastpar in [9]. We will use this framework to provide an achievable secrecy rate region.
A. Nested Lattice Code
The compute-and-forward framework is based on nested lattice codes and therefore we
recall some lattice definitions that are used throughout the paper. For further details on lattice
codes see [28], [29], [8], [30].
An n-dimensional lattice Λ ⊂ Rn is a group under addition with generator matrix G ∈
Rn×n:
Λ = {Gc : c ∈ Zn}. (6)
A lattice quantizer is a mapping QΛ : Rn → Λ that maps a point x to the nearest lattice
point in Euclidean distance,
QΛ(x) = arg min
λ∈Λ
‖x− λ‖. (7)
Let the modulo operation with respect to the lattice Λ be defined as
x mod Λ = x−QΛ(x). (8)
We call V = {x : QΛ(x) = 0} the fundamental Voronoi region of the lattice Λ and denote
by Vol (V) the volume of V. Two lattices ΛC and ΛF are called nested, if ΛC ⊆ ΛF . We call
ΛC the coarse lattice and ΛF the fine lattice. A nested lattice code L is formed by taking
all of the points of the fine lattice ΛF in the fundamental Voronoi region VC of the coarse
lattice ΛC , i.e., L = ΛF ∩ VC . The rate of a nested lattice code is given by
r =
1
n
log |L| = 1
n
log
Vol (VC)
Vol (VF )
. (9)
From [10] and [30] we know that there exist good nested lattice codes that can achieve the
capacity of an AWGN channel. These nested lattice codes have been used to develop the
compute-and-forward framework [9], [8]. We utilize this framework as relaying strategy and
extend it with secrecy constraints as described above.
B. Encoding
Each user node ` chooses a message w` ∈ Fkp i.i.d. from a uniform distribution over the
index set {1, 2, . . . , 2bnRsc}. For the ease of simplicity we assume equal message length at
all users. If this is no the case, messages with length smaller than k will be padded to length
k with zeros. Each message gets mapped to a lattice code L = ΛF ∩ VC where the second
moment of ΛC equals P such that the power constraint is satisfied. In order to fulfill the
secrecy requirements some additional effort is required. Each user node ` uses the same
codebook L = ΛF ∩ VC with |ΛF ∩ VC | = 2bn(Rs+Rd)c. Like wiretap codes, this codebook
is randomly binned into several bins, where each bin contains 2bnRdc codewords. The secret
message w` gets mapped to the bins. The actual transmitted codeword t` is chosen from that
bin according to a uniform distribution.
Further we add some dither u` that is uniform distributed over VC and known by the
relay. This dithering gives statistical properties of the transmitted signal needed to achieve
the compute-and-forward rate [9]. It was shown in [9, Appendix C] that this dither might
be chosen in a deterministic way. To make sure that the transmit signal fulfills the power
constraint, we build the modulo with respect to the coarse lattice. We get the following
n-dimensional transmit vector at node `
x` = [t` + u`] mod ΛC . (10)
With this encoding scheme we get the following rates:
a) Rd is the rate of the randomly chosen messages within a bin,
b) Rs is the secret message rate, and
c) Rs +Rd = 1n log2
Vol(VC)
Vol(VF )
is the transmit rate of the user nodes.
III. SIMO MULTI-WAY RELAY CHANNEL
In the following section we investigate the SIMO channel, i.e., the relay is equipped with
multiple antennas. The system model for the first phase from the user nodes to the relay is
shown in Figure 2. We want to point out, that this is the most general case without assuming
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channels because the SISO and MISO channel can
be seen as special cases as described later.
w1 E1 + D1 yˆ1
wL EL + DL−1 yˆL−1
H B
z1
zηR
x1
xL
y1
yηR
y˜1
y˜L−1
User nodes Channel Relay
Figure 2: System model of a SIMO L-user relay channel (MAC phase)
A. Channel Model
We assume the relay is equipped with ηR antennas and therefore receives ηR signals
y1, . . . , yηR . The channel is characterized by the channel matrix H ∈ RηR×L whose entries
hij are the fading coefficients from the j-th user to the i-th antenna at the relay. Note that
by this representation the i-th row of H , denoted by hi, represents the channel from user i
to the relay. The channel model for the first phase is then given by
Y = HX + Z, (11)
where X ∈ RL×n is a matrix whose i-th row is the transpose transmit vector x′i of user i.
Further, Y ∈ RηR×n is a matrix whose i-th row represents the received data stream y′i at the
i-th antenna and Z ∈ RηR×n is white Gaussian noise. The rows of Z are denoted by zi and are
i.i.d. according to a normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance, i.e., zi ∼ N(0, In).
The relay decodes L−1 linear combinations of the original messages and encodes them with
a capacity achieving code. The L − 1 codewords are then sent to all users simultaneously
in the remaining L − 1 phases. Note that for these phases we have a broadcast channel
and we assume reciprocal channels which are constant over all L phases. Therefore the rate
constraints for the last L − 1 phases are given by the capacity of the individual point-to-
point channels. Due to the uplink-downlink duality for reciprocal channels and equal power
constraints [31, Chapter 10.3], these are always larger or equal to the MAC rate region and
the first phase will be the limiting phase. Therefore we will focus on that phase for developing
the achievable rate of the whole system.
B. Relay Strategy
The relay uses compute-and-forward [9] as relaying strategy and tries to decode L − 1
linear combination of the original messages as shown in Figure 2. It uses a preprocessing
matrix B to get the optimal signals prior to decoding. The achievable computation rate is
then given by [9], [32]
R(H, a`, b`) =
1
2
log2
(
P
‖b`‖2 + P‖H ′b` − a`‖2
)
, (12)
where a` is the coefficient vector for the `-th linear combination and b` is the preprocessing
vector corresponding to the `-th row in B. The optimal preprocessing matrix for a given
coefficient matrix A = (a′1, . . . , a
′
L−1)
′ and the resulting rates have been found in [32]. We
use these results and provide them in the following for completeness.
The optimal preprocessing matrix is given by
B = AH ′(HH ′ + 1
P
IηR)
−1. (13)
Plugging in (13) in (12), we get
R(H, a`) = −1
2
log2(a
′
`V DV
′a`), (14)
where V ∈ RL×L is the right eigenmatrix of H and D ∈ RL×L is a diagonal matrix with
elements
Dii =

1
Pλi+1
i ≤ rank(H)
1 i > rank(H)
, (15)
where λi is the i-th eigenvalue of H ′H .
All L − 1 linear combinations have to be decodable at the relay to allow all L users to
decode all original messages. Therefore the resulting achievable rate of all L users is
RCF = min
`∈{1,...,L−1}
R(H, a`). (16)
To get the highest possible rates we need to find a set of full rank equations with coefficient
matrix A ∈ ZL−1×L. Because all L users need to be able to decode all messages, we
additionally require the rows of A to be linear independent of all vectors e` where e` is the
unit vector with a one at the `-th position and zeros elsewhere. This results in the following
optimization problem
max
A`
min
`∈{1,...,L−1}
(
−1
2
log2(a
′
`V DV
′a`)
)
s.t. rank(A`) = L, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
(17)
where
A` =

a′1
...
a′L−1
e′`

=

a1,1 a1,2 . . . a1,L
...
... . . .
...
aL−1,1 aL−1,2 . . . aL−1,L
0 0 1 0

.
This can be solved by several algorithms [33], [34] with additional constraints.
For the first phase we get the following rate constraint
Rs +Rd ≤ RCF . (18)
In the second phase the relay maps all decoded linear combinations yˆi ∈ ΛF ∩VC to an index
of the set {1, 2, . . . , 2bnRrc} and uses a capacity achieving code to encode and an optimal
beamforming vector to transmit to the user nodes with rate
Rr = max‖ω‖2≤1
min
`∈{1,...,L}
1
2
log2(1 + P (ω
′h`)2), (19)
where ω is the multicast beamforming vector at the relay. An efficient way to obtain the
optimal beamforming vector can be found in [35].
C. Decoding at the user nodes
In each of the L−1 phases, each user node receives an index of the set {1, 2, . . . , 2bnRrc}.
They can decode as long as the transmission rate from relay to user is less than the point-
to-point capacity of the channels, which is given in (19). If decoded successfully they know
the lattice point yˆ` ∈ ΛF ∩ VC being transmitted by the relay.
User ` can decode the original lattice points from the other users by solving the following
system of linear equations
A`T = Y˜` (20)
where
Y˜` =

yˆ1,1 yˆ1,2 . . . yˆ1,n
...
... . . .
...
yˆL−1,1 yˆL−1,2 . . . yˆL−1,n
t`,1 t`,2 . . . t`,n

. (21)
It gets an estimate of the transmitted lattice points t` of the users 1, . . . , L by
Tˆ` = A
−1
` Y˜`. (22)
User ` already knows t` because this is its own message. Please note that the users get the
lattice points without the dither because the relay already subtracted it.
After solving for T` each user knows all L lattice point. If the lattice point is known, the
message and the bin is known. Therefore each user gets all L messages.
From all L phases we obtain a rate constraint for the source nodes given by
Rd +Rs ≤ min{RCF , Rr} = RCF . (23)
From the lattice code construction in Section II-A and (23) we get the following constraint
for the secure communication rate Rs
Rs ≤ RCF −Rd. (24)
We get the same constraint for all source nodes because all use the same nested lattice chain.
To ensure that the relay will not get any information about individual messages, the rate Rd
has to be chosen appropriately. This will be addressed in the next section.
D. Achievable Secrecy Rate Region
In this section we provide an achievable secrecy rate region. The proof is given in the
appendix.
Theorem 1 (Achievable Secrecy Rate). Consider a multi-way relay channel with L users
and ηR antennas at the relay. The channel is characterized by the matrix H whose entries
hij represent the fading coefficient from the j-th user to the i-th antenna at the relay. All
nodes can only communicate via the relay and have no direct links. Each node has a transmit
power constraint ‖xi‖2 ≤ nP, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L, r}. Then the weak secrecy rate region is given
by
L ·Rs ≤ max
{
0, LRCF − 12 log2 det(IηR + PHH ′)
}
where
RCF = min
i∈{1,...,L−1}
R(H, ai)
with ai chosen in programming problem (17).
E. Power Allocation
Every source node has a power constraint ‖x`‖ ≤ nP . However, it is not always optimal
to send at full power and therefore the transmit power for each source node needs to be
optimized. We define a diagonal matrix Ptr = diag(
√
P1, . . . ,
√
PL) which contains the square
roots of the individual transmit powers of the source nodes. Further, we define the effective
channel as H˜ = HPtr. This results in the following optimization problem
max
P`≤P
LRCF − 12 log2 det(IηR +HPtrP ′trH ′), (25)
where
RCF = min
`∈{1,...,L−1}
−1
2
log2(a
′
`V DV
′a`), (26)
where V is the right singular matrix of H˜ and D is a diagonal matrix with elements
Dii =

1
λi+1
i ≤ rank(H˜)
1 i > rank(H˜)
, (27)
where λi is the i-th eigenvalue of H˜ ′H˜ .
This problem is hard to solve because of the non-linearity and non-convexity. The scope
of this paper does not include an analytic result or an algorithm. For the simulations we use
a grid search algorithm to obtain the optimal power allocation.
IV. SISO AND MISO MULTI-WAY RELAY CHANNEL
In this section we provide the achievable secrecy rates for the following cases:
• single antenna at the source nodes and the relay; SISO,
• multiple antennas at the source nodes and single antenna at the relay; MISO.
These can be written as special cases of the SIMO case.
A. SISO
The results for the SISO case can be derived directly from Theorem 1 where the channel
matrix reduces to a vector.
Corollary 1. Consider a multi-way relay channel with L users and single antennas at all
nodes. The channel from user ` to the relay is characterized by the coefficient h` ∈ R with
h = (h1, . . . , hL)
′. All nodes can only communicate via the relay and have no direct links.
Each node has a transmit power constraint ‖xi‖2 ≤ nP, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L, r}. Then the weak
secrecy rate region is given by
L ·Rs ≤ max
{
0, LRCF − 12 log2(1 + ‖h˜‖2)
}
where
RCF = min
i∈{1,...,L−1}
log+2
((
‖ai‖2 − (h˜
′ai)2
1 + ‖h˜‖2
)−1)
.
Further, h˜ = diag(
√
P1, . . . ,
√
PL) · h is the effective channel and P` ≤ P is the transmit
power at user `.
B. MISO
For the MISO case we assume no cooperation at the source nodes for choosing the
beamforming vectors. Therefore it is optimal to use maximum ratio transmission (MRT)
in the direction of the channel. This leaves us with an reduced optimization problem where
we only have to choose the optimal power allocation. The effective channel is
h˜ = diag(
√
P1, . . . ,
√
PL) · (h′1ω1, . . . , h′LωL)′, (28)
where h` is the channel vector from user ` to the relay and ω` is the beamforming vector
with ‖ω`‖ ≤ 1 for user `. Using MRT we get
ω` =
h`
‖h`‖ and h
′
`ω` = ‖h`‖. (29)
The secrecy rate is now equivalent to the one in the SISO case and we get the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. Consider a multi-way relay channel with L users and ηT antennas at the user
nodes. The relay is equipped with a single antenna. The channel from user ` to the relay is
characterized by the vector h` ∈ RηT . All nodes can only communicate via the relay and have
no direct links. Each node has a transmit power constraint ‖xi‖2 ≤ nP, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L, r}.
Then the weak secrecy rate region is given by
L ·Rs ≤ max
{
0, LRCF − 12 log2(1 + ‖h˜‖2)
}
where
RCF = min
i∈{1,...,L−1}
log+2
((
‖ai‖2 − (h˜
′ai)2
1 + ‖h˜‖2
)−1)
.
Further, h˜ = diag(
√
P1, . . . ,
√
PL) · (‖h1‖, . . . , ‖hL‖)′ is the effective channel and P` ≤ P is
the transmit power at user `.
V. 2-USER CASE: TWO-WAY RELAY CHANNEL
In this section we consider the special case of two users which is also known as the
two-way relay channel. We restrict ourselves to the SISO case where all nodes are equipped
with single antennas. This system model is quite common in literature and one can find a
lot of work on the achievable rate without secrecy [36], [37], [38] as well as with secrecy
[17], [19], [15], [39], [40]. Most of the work models the two-way relay channel as a wiretap
channel where the second user is helping the first user by jamming the eavesdropper, i.e., the
relay [27], [41]. This differs from our work because we assume that both users transmit a
secure message simultaneously. Further, most of the work so far considers the two-way relay
channel without fading and those results cannot be directly extended to fading channels.
However, to be able to compare our result to existing schemes we relax our model to
match the one assumed in [27]. That is, user 1 transmits a secure message to user 2 via an
untrusted relay. User 2 helps by sending a jamming signal to the relay. The main difference
to our more general model is the fact, that the message of the second user does not need to
be secure. Further, we assume that the channel coefficients are equal and set to 1. With this
relaxed model we get the following secrecy rate.
Theorem 2. Consider a two-way relay channel with fading coefficients h1 = h2 = 1 and
equal power constraint P . The following secrecy rate is achievable with a cooperative jammer
Rs ≤ max
{
0,
1
2
log2
(
1
2
+ P
)
− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
P
1 + P
)}
= RCFs .
Proof: The following proof does not necessarily require that the channel fading
coefficients are 1. Therefore we provide the proof with fading coefficients and choose them
to be 1 at the end to get result of Theorem 2. The proof follows the same steps as the
proof for the L-user multi-way relay channel, except that we have only the following secrecy
requirement:
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1 | Yr) ≥ lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1) = Rs. (30)
We start by bounding the conditional entropy of the message W1 given the received signal
Yr at the relay,
H(W1 | Yr) (31)
= H(W1 | X1, Yr) +H(X1 | Yr)−H(X1 | W1, Yr) (32)
≥ H(X1 | Yr)− nδ(n) (33)
= H(X1 | Yr)−H(X1) +H(X1)− nδ(n) (34)
= H(X1)− I(X1;Yr)− nδ(n), (35)
where we used Fano’s inequality to bound the last term in (32). This is because the size of
each bin is kept small enough such that given W1, the eavesdropper/the relay can determine
X1 from its received signal Yr [27].
We now need a lower bound on the mutual information between X1 and Yr.
I(X1;Yr) (36)
= h(Yr)− h(Yr | X1) (37)
≤ n · 1
2
log2(2pie(Ph
2
1 + Ph
2
2 + 1))− h(h2X2 + Zr) (38)
The last inequality follows from the fact that a normal distribution maximizes the entropy
under an average power constraint. The last term can be expressed as follows,
h(h2X2 + Zr) (39)
= h(h2X2 + Zr | h2X2) + I(h2X2;h2X2 + Zr) (40)
= h(Zr) + I(h2X2;h2X2 + Zr), (41)
where h(Zr) = 12 log2(2pie). From [10] we know that
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(h2X2;h2X2 + Zr) =
1
2
log2(1 + h
2
2P ). (42)
If we combine (38), (41) and (42) we get
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(X1 | Yr) (43)
≥ lim
n→∞
1
n
[H(X1)− I(X1;Yr)− nδ(n)] (44)
≥ lim
n→∞
1
n
[H(X1)− n · 12 log2(2pie(h21P + h22P + 1))
+ h(Zr) + I(h2X2;h2X2 + Zr)] (45)
= (Rs +Rd)− 12 log2(h21P + h22P + 1)
+ lim
n→∞
1
n
I(h2X2;h2X2 + Zr) (46)
= (Rs +Rd)− 12 log2
(
1 +
h21P
1 + h22P
)
(47)
Because Rs +Rd ≤ RCF we get the following result,
Rs ≤ RCF − 12 log2
(
1 +
h21P
1 + h22P
)
. (48)
Choosing h1 = h2 = 1 we get the result of Theorem 2. This concludes the proof.
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Figure 3: Achievable secrecy rate of the two-way relay channel with h = (1, 1)′ and σ2 = 1
for different schemes.
In the following we compare our result for the two-way relay channel to other approaches
and illustrate the results in Figure 3. The first result is a scheme by He and Yener which
provides a weak secrecy result [27], i.e.,
Rs ≤ max{0, 12 log2(12 + P )− 1} = RHSs . (49)
This result is extended in [15] for strong secrecy. The achievable secrecy rate is shown to be
the same as for weak secrecy by utilizing a hash function. Please note that we can extend
our result as well with a hash function to get a result for strong secrecy. This will be the
topic of future research and is not considered in this paper.
The second scheme is provided by Kashyap et al. in [26]. The achievable secrecy rates
are
Rs ≤ max{0, 12 log2(P )− 1− log2(e)} = RKPs (50)
and
Rs ≤ max{0, 12 log2(12 + P )− log2(2e)} = RKSs (51)
for perfect and strong secrecy, respectively. Observe that RCF ≥ RCFs ≥ RHSs ≥ RKSs ≥ RKPs .
R
2
[b
it/
cu
]
R1 [bit/cu]
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
(1, 2)
(0, 1)
(1, 0)
(1, 1)
(2, 1)
(2, 2)
Rs
Figure 4: MAC capacity region (blue line) with achievable compute-and-forward rates for
different coefficient vectors a (red dots) for h = (0.9, 0.8)′ and P = 10 Watt.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss and illustrate Theorem 1, Corollary 1 and Corollary 2. It is
interesting to note, that the achievable secrecy rate is the difference between the achievable
compute-and-forward sum rate and the sum capacity of the MAC. This means, we get a
secrecy rate greater than zero if the compute-and-forward rate region is larger than the MAC
capacity region. This is illustrated in Figure 4 for the two user case, where we plotted the
achievable rate regions for the channel coefficients (0.9, 0.8)′ and a transmit power constraint
of P = 10 Watt. The dots in Figure 4 mark the corner points of the achievable compute-and-
forward rate regions for different linear combinations. The solid line illustrates the border of
the MAC capacity region. As one can see, a rate greater than the MAC sum capacity is only
achievable for a single coefficient vector, in this example a = (1, 1)′. In general there can
be at most one point or several linear dependent points outside the MAC capacity region.
Otherwise the relay would be able to decode the single messages by solving a system of
linear equations which contradicts the MAC capacity definition. From this illustration we
see, that it is only possible to transmit secure messages via the relay, if the source nodes
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Figure 5: MAC capacity region with achievable compute-and-forward rates for different
coefficient vectors a at full transmit power (dashdotted line and crosses) and at optimal
transmit power (7.7, 10.0) Watt (blue solid line and red dots) for h = (0.8, 0.5)′ and P = 10
Watt.
transmit at a rate outside the MAC capacity. This ensures that the relay cannot decode the
single messages but only a linear combination, if the compute-and-forward rate is higher
than the MAC sum capacity. In Figure 4 it is optimal to transmit at full power. In Figure 5
we show that this is not always the case. Therefore we plotted the achievable rate regions
for the channel coefficients (0.8, 0.5)′ and a transmit power constraint of P = 10 Watt. As
one can see optimizing the power means reducing the transmit power for one user node.
Because the channel coefficients of the effective channel are then closer to each other, we
achieve a higher computation rate for the coefficient a = (1, 1)′ while reducing the MAC
sum capacity at the same time. We want to stress here the not common behavior that it is
possible to increase the secrecy rate by reducing the transmit power.
A. Achievability Of Positive Secrecy Rates
The achievable compute-and-forward sum rate is the double of the computation rate at the
relay. The achievable computation rate depends highly on the channel coefficients because
the compute-and-forward framework tries to approximate the real valued channel coefficients
with integer valued network coding coefficients. This means that there does not always exist a
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Figure 6: Existence of a compute-and-forward rate tuple outside of the multiple access channel
capacity region. P/σ2 = 5dB.
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Figure 7: Existence of a compute-and-forward rate tuple outside of the multiple access channel
capacity region. P/σ2 = 20dB.
network coding coefficient vector with an achievable computation rate which is larger than the
MAC capacity. We show in Figure 6 and Figure 7 the achievable secrecy rate for different
channel realizations in a two user scenario, i.e., the two-way relay channel with a single
antenna at all nodes. One can see that the achievable secrecy rate reaches its highest values
if the channel coefficients are equal. One can also see that small channel coefficient values
do not achieve positive secrecy rates. One can compensate this behavior in part by adjusting
the power allocation such that the effective channel coefficients are close to each other.
Unfortunately, when we assume that the channel coefficients are distributed by hi ∼ N(0, 1),
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Figure 8: Percentage of channel realizations resulting in positive secrecy rates for different
numbers of users and SNR values for the SISO multi-way relay channel without optimal
power allocation. 10,000 channel realizations are drawn from a normal distribution N(0, 1).
the small channel coefficients occur with higher probability. The question arises how many
channel realizations result in a positive secrecy rate when we draw the channel coefficients
from a normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance. The result for the SISO case
without optimized power allocation is show in Figure 8 where we used 10,000 i.i.d. channel
realizations. One can see that only in the two-way relay channel we achieve positive secrecy
rates for a reasonable amount of channel realizations. This might be a depressing result but
we can do better by optimizing the transmit power and introducing multiple antennas. The
result for a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 5dB is shown in Figure 9. One can see that alone
by optimizing the power allocation in the SISO case we increase the channel realizations
resulting in a positive secrecy rate from 18.19% to 52.1%. Introducing multiple antennas at
the source nodes results in 100% of positive secrecy rates. Introducing multiple antennas at
the relay is contra-beneficial because we give the eavesdropper more degrees of freedom.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented an achievable secrecy rate region for the L-user relay
channel where all nodes want to securely transmit messages via an untrusted relay. We have
shown that the proposed coding strategy, based on the compute-and-forward framework,
supports simultaneous secure communications. The proposed achievable secrecy rate is the
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Figure 9: Percentage of channel realizations resulting in positive secrecy rates and the
according average secrecy rates for P/σ2 = 5dB. All schemes use optimal power allocation.
1000 channel realizations are drawn from a normal distribution N(0, 1).
difference between the MAC sum capacity and the computation rate of the compute-and-
forward framework. We have provided a proof for the achievability of the secrecy rate region
and have discussed this result. We have seen that this scheme performs quit good in the 2-user
case, commonly known as the two-way untrusted relay channel. Therefore we investigated this
scenario in detail and showed the dependency of the performance on the channel realizations.
We showed that by introducing multiple antennas at the source nodes and optimizing the
transmit power we can significantly increase the secrecy rate.
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Table I: Overview of variables and symbols
variable distribution comment
Wi ∼ U({1, 2, . . . , d2nRse}) secret message of length k
Ui ∼ U(VC) dither at node i
Xi ∼ U(VC) transmit vector at node i
Zj ∼ N(0, In) AWGN at relay antenna j
Yj continuous received vector at relay antenna j
APPENDIX
In this section we provide the proof of Theorem 1. An overview over all random variables
is provided in Table I.
Proof: For the achievability of the secrecy rate region we must show that the following
weak secrecy condition holds:
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W;Y | U1, . . . , UL) = 0, (52)
for all W ∈ P({W1, . . . ,WL}) and all Y ∈ P({Y1, . . . , YηR}) where P(X) is the power set of
X . For the ease of readability we omit the condition on U1, . . . , UL in the following since the
dither is present and known in every mutual information and entropy and does not change
the equations. By using the chain rule for mutual information we see that1
I(W1, . . . ,WL;Y1, . . . , YηR)− I(W1, . . . ,Wm;Y1, . . . , YηR)
=
L∑
`=m
I(W`;Y1, . . . , YηR | W1, . . . ,W`−1). (53)
Because of the non-negativity of mutual information we have
I(W1, . . . ,WL;Y1, . . . , YηR)
− I(W1, . . . ,Wm;Y1, . . . , YηR) ≥ 0 (54)
1Note that for ` = L : I(WL;Y1, . . . , YηR |W1, . . . ,WL−1) 6= 0 because of the random binning.
and therefore
I(W1, . . . ,WL;Y1, . . . , YηR)
≥ I(W1, . . . ,Wm;Y1, . . . , YηR), ∀m < L. (55)
Using the symmetry of mutual information and the same arguments as above, we can show
that
I(W1, . . . ,WL;Y1, . . . , YηR)
≥ I(W1, . . . ,WL;Y1, . . . , Ym), ∀m < ηR. (56)
Hence, it is sufficient to show that
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W1, . . . ,WL;Y1, . . . , YηR) = 0 (57)
which implies (52). This condition is equivalent to
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WL)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WL | Y1, . . . , YηR).
(58)
We can explicitly write the left hand side and get
L ·Rs ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WL | Y1, . . . , YηR). (59)
We now need a lower bound on the right hand side.
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WL | Y1, . . . , YηR) (60)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
[H(W1, . . . ,WL | X1, . . . , XL, Y1, . . . , YηR)
+H(X1, . . . , XL | Y1, . . . , YηR) (61)
−H(X1, . . . , XL | W1, . . . ,WL, Y1, . . . , YηR)]
a)
≥ lim
n→∞
1
n
[H(X1, . . . , XL | Y1, . . . , YηR)− nδ(n)] (62)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
[H(X1, . . . , XL | Y1, . . . , YηR) (63)
−H(X1, . . . , XL) +H(X1, . . . , XL)− nδ(n)]
= lim
n→∞
1
n
[H(X1, . . . , XL) (64)
− I(X1, . . . , XL;Y1, . . . , YηR)− nδ(n)]
b)
≥ L · (Rs +Rd)− 12 log2 det(IηR + PHH ′) (65)
We have used the following arguments:
a) We used Fano’s inequality to bound the last term. This is because the size of each
bin is kept small enough such that given W1, . . . ,WL, the eavesdropper can determine
X1, . . . , XL from the received signals.
b) We note that the term I(X1, . . . , XL;Y1, . . . , YηR) corresponds to the mutual information
of a MIMO channel. We rewrite the mutual information in terms of entropy, i.e.,
I(X1, . . . , XL;Y1, . . . , YηR)
= h(Y1, . . . , YηR)− h(Y1, . . . , YηR | X1, . . . , XL). (66)
We use the fact that the normal distribution maximizes the entropy for an average power
constraint to get an upper bound on the first term. Furthermore, from [42, Section 3.2]
we know that if X is distributed according to a normal distribution with zero-mean and
covariance E[xx′] = PIL than Y = HX + Z is also distributed according to a normal
distribution with zero-mean and covarianz E[yy′] = PHH ′ + IηR .
h(Y1, . . . , YηR) = h(Y1,1, . . . , Y1,n, . . . , YηR,1, . . . , YηR,n)
= h(Y1,1, . . . , YηR,1, . . . , Y1,n, . . . , YηR,n)
≤
n∑
i=1
h(Y1,i, . . . , YηR,i)
≤ n · 1
2
log2((2pie)
L det(PHH ′ + IηR)).
The only uncertainty in the received signals Y1, . . . , YηR , if the transmitted signals
X1, . . . , XL are given, comes from the noise Z1, . . . , ZηR . The noise is i.i.d. with respect
to a normal distribution which results in the following entropy:
h(Y1, . . . , YηR | X1, . . . , XL)
= h(Z1, . . . , ZηR)
=
n∑
i=1
h(Z1,i, . . . , ZηR,i)
= n · h(Z1,i, . . . , ZηR,i)
= n · 1
2
log2((2pie)
L det(IηR)).
Putting everything together results in
I(X1, . . . , XL;Y1, . . . , YηR)
≤ n · 1
2
log2((2pie)
L det(PHH ′ + IηR))
− n · 1
2
log2((2pie)
L det(IηR))
= n · 1
2
log2
(2pie)L det(PHH ′ + IηR)
(2pie)L det(IηR)
= n · 1
2
log2 det(IηR + PHH
′).
Since all rates are symmetric and Rs +Rd ≤ RCF we get the following weak secrecy rate
L ·Rs ≤ L ·RCF − 12 log2 det(IηR + PHH ′). (67)
This concludes the proof.
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